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NOIDA INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, (NIET Business School) GREATER NOIDA
PGDM (Standard)

TRIMESTER-I THEORY EXAMINATION (2024-2025)

Subject: Managerial Economics

Time: 2Hrs.30 min**Max. Marks:60****General Instructions:****IMP:** Verify that you have received question paper with correct course, code, branch etc.

1. This Question paper comprises of three Sections -A, B, & C. It consists of Short type questions & Subjective type questions.
2. Maximum marks for each question are indicated on right hand side of each question.
3. Illustrate your answers with neat sketches wherever necessary.
4. Assume suitable data if necessary.
5. Preferably, write the answers in sequential order.
6. No sheet should be left blank. Any written material after a blank sheet will not be evaluated/checked.

SECTION – A**15**1. Attempt **all** parts:-

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1-a. Define Opportunity Cost. (CO1,K1) | 1 |
| 1-b. Define Elasticity of Demand. (CO2,K1) | 1 |
| 1-c. Define the concept of Marginal Cost. (CO3,K1) | 1 |
| 1-d. Define the term “Equilibrium”. (CO4,K1) | 1 |
| 1-e. Define Nash Equilibrium. (CO5,K1) | 1 |

2. Attempt **all** parts:-

- | | |
|---|---|
| 2.a. Explain any two practical implications of Managerial Economics. (CO1,K3) | 2 |
| 2.b. Explain any two practical implications of cross elasticity of demand? (CO2,K3) | 2 |
| 2.c. Explain Cobb-Douglas production function.(CO3,K2) | 2 |
| 2.d. Define price discrimination.(CO4,K2) | 2 |
| 2.e Define game theory. (CO5,K2) | 2 |

SECTION – B**15**3. Answer any **three** of the following-

- | | |
|---|---|
| 3-a. Demonstrate the relationship of economics with other disciplines of management. (CO1,K3) | 5 |
|---|---|

- 3-b. What is demand forecasting? Sketch the various demand forecasting methods. (CO2,K3) 5
- 3-c. Examine law of variable proportions.(CO3, K4) 5
- 3-d. Explain the features of monopoly and oligopoly.(CO4,K2) 5
- 3-e. Discuss the characteristics of game theory? (CO5,K2) 5

SECTION – C

30

Case Let & Application Based

4. Answer any **one** of the following-
- 4-a. Discuss the importance of studying managerial economics for a manager.(CO1,K2) 6
- 4-b. Explain the nature & scope of managerial economics. (CO1,K2) 6
5. Answer any **one** of the following- 6
- 5-a. Appraise the properties of indifference curve? (CO2, K5) 6
- 5-b. Discuss the significance of the price elasticity of demand.(CO2,K2) 6
6. Answer any **one** of the following-
- 6-a. Explain the law of increasing returns. Why it is observed to be applicable in industries?(CO3, K3) 6
- 6-b. Interpret the law of diminishing returns. (CO3,K3) 6
7. Answer any **one** of the following-
- 7-a. Define perfect competition? Explain the price output determination under perfect competition in short run and long run. (CO4,K3) 6
- 7-b. Define monopoly competition? Explain the price output determination under monopoly competition.(CO4,K3) 6
8. Answer any **one** of the following-
- 8-a. You are considering entering a market serviced by a monopolist. You currently earn \$0 economic profits, while the monopolist earns \$5. If you enter the market and the monopolist engages in a price war, you will lose \$5 and the monopolist will earn \$1. If the monopolist doesn't engage in a price war, you will each earn profits of \$2. 6
- a. Write out the extensive form of the above game.

- b. There are two Nash equilibria for the game. What are they?
- c. Is there a subgame perfect equilibrium? Explain.
- d. If you were the potential entrant, would you enter? Explain why or why not. (CO5,K4)

- 8-b. In a one-shot game, if you advertise and your rival advertises, you will each earn \$5 million in profits. If neither of you advertise, your rival will make \$4 million and you will make \$2 million. If you advertise and your rival does not, you will make \$10 million and your rival will make \$3 million. If your rival advertises and you do not, you will make \$1 million and your rival will make \$3 million. 6
- a. Write the above game in normal form.
 - b. Do you have a dominant strategy?
 - c. Does your rival have a dominant strategy?
 - d. What is the Nash equilibrium for the one-shot game?
 - e. How much would you be willing to bribe your rival not to advertise?(CO5,K4)